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Using non-commutative monoids to construct
three-party key establishment
Song Han, Elizabeth Chang, Tharam S. Dillon
Abstract— Three-party key establishment protocol can
help three participants to establish a shared secret key
through interactions via public channels. In this paper,
a novel three-party key agreement protocol is proposed.
The protocol is based on non-commutative monoids in
mathematics. It is a generic construction and one-time
protocol per key establishment.
Index Terms— Generic construction, key establishment,
non-commutative monoid, one-time three-party key agree-
ment, shared secret key
I. INTRODUCTION
AKey establishment protocol is used to derivea shared secret by two or more parties as a
function of information contributed by, or associated
with, each of these, but no single party can prede-
termine the resulting value. Several key agreement
protocols based on group theory have been proposed
[1, 2, 3]. However, all these protocols are for two
parties to establish a secret key. Those schemes
cannot be transferred to three-party scenario in
their present forms. On the other hand, for three-
party key agreement, the probability of possible
information leakage is larger than the one of two-
party key agreement. This is because in the former
case, the information amount transmitted between
parties is much greater than that of the latter case.
Therefore, it is interesting to propose a three-party
key agreement protocol based on non-commutative
monoids. In addition, the proposed key agreement
should be immune from the existing attacks on
algebraic method based cryptographic primitives.
In this paper, we will propose a generic three-
party key agreement based on non-commutative
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monoids. The protocol is of one-time per key agree-
ment. That means the secret keys as well as public
keys of three participants are used only once for
each key establishment. This can help to prevent
from some existing attacks.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as
follows: In the next section, some computational
preliminaries are presented. Section III provides
the proposed three-party key establishment scheme.
Section IV analyses security discussion on the pro-
posed scheme. The last section concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
The mathematical definition for monoids will
be reviewed in this section. In abstract algebra,
a monoid is an algebraic structure with a single,
associative binary operation and an identity element.
Definition A monoid is a set M with binary
operation ∗ : M× M → M, obeying the following
axioms:
• Associativity: for all a, b, c ∈ M, (a ∗ b) ∗ c =
a ∗ (b ∗ c).
• Identity element: there exists an element e ∈
M, such that for all a ∈ M, a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a.
• Closure: for all a, b ∈ M, a ∗ b is in M.
Alternatively, a monoid is a semigroup with an
identity element.
A monoid satisfies all the axioms of a group with
the exception of having inverses. A monoid with
inverses is the same thing as a group.
Definition Submonoid: A submonoid of a monoid
M, is a subset N of M containing the unit element,
and such that, if x, y ∈ N, then x ∗ y ∈ N.
III. ONE-TIME THREE-PARTY KEY AGREEMENT
BASED ON NON-COMMUTATIVE MONOIDS
Assume three participants Alice, Bob and Cindy
will involve in the following protocol. Their unique
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means of communications is through public chan-
nels. Here one-time three-party key agreement in-
dicates that the participants re-choose their secret
keys for every time protocol run. This can help to
prevent attacks from compromising possible long-
term secret keys.
A. System setsup
Consider a 5-tuple: (S, T, α, f1, f2), where S and
T are computable and non-commutative monoids.
The three maps α, f1 and f2 are operations over S
and T and defined as follows:
α : S× S 7→ T
f1 : S× T 7→ T
f2 : S× T 7→ T
They adhere to three axioms:
• Axiom 1: For all g, g1, and g2 ∈ S,
α(g, g1 · g2) = α(g, g1) · α(g, g2);
• Axiom 2: For any g, h ∈ S, f1(g, α(h, g)) =
f2(h, α(g, h));
• Axiom 3: Given public elements g1, g2, ..., gn ∈
S, h ∈ S is a secret element, while
α(h, g1), α(h, g2), ..., α(h, gn)
are publicly known. Then, to determine h is
not computable in polynomial time (i.e. it is
infeasible in polynomial time).
Alice, Bob and Cindy will establish a shared
secret key through running the following protocol.
The n1, n2, and n3 are three positive integers. We
assume SA 6= SB 6= SC for the following three
monoids SA, SB, and SC.
1) Step 1.1: Alice is assigned a public monoid
SA $ S. Suppose SA is generated by the
elements
a1, a2, · · ·, an1 .
That is, for any element x ∈ SA, x can




i , where ki
(1 ≤ i ≤ n1) are non-negative integers .
2) Step 1.2: Bob is assigned a public monoid
SB $ S. Suppose SB is generated by the
elements
b1, b2, · · ·, bn2 .
3) Step 1.3: Cindy is assigned a public monoid
SC $ S. Suppose SC is generated by the
elements
c1, c2, · · ·, cn3 .
4) Step 1.4: Alice randomly chooses n1 non-








Then a ∈ SA (Alice keeps e1(i)(1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
privately). She then computes
α(a, b1), α(a, b2), · · ·, α(a, bn2)
and
α(a, c1), α(a, c2), · · ·, α(a, cn3)
Alice’s secret key is a while her public key
includes {α(a, b1), α(a, b2), · · ·, α(a, bn2)}
and {α(a, c1), α(a, c2), · · ·, α(a, cn3)}.
5) Step 1.5: Bob randomly chooses n2 non-








Then b ∈ SB (Bob keeps e2(i)(1 ≤ i ≤ n2)
privately). Bob then computes
α(b, c1), α(b, c2), · · ·, α(b, cn3)
and
α(b, a1), α(b, a2), · · ·, α(b, an1).
Bob’s secret key is b while public key
includes {α(b, a1), α(b, a2), · · ·, α(b, an1)}
and {α(b, c1), α(b, c2), · · ·, α(b, cn3)}
6) Step 1.6: Cindy randomly chooses n3 non-
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Then c ∈ SC (Cindy keeps e3(i)(1 ≤ i ≤ n3)
privately). She then computes
α(c, a1), α(c, a2), · · ·, α(c, an1)
and
α(c, b1), α(c, b2), · · ·, α(c, bn2).
Cindy’s secret key is c while public key
includes {α(c, a1), α(c, a2), · · ·, α(c, an1)}
and {α(c, b1), α(c, b2), · · ·, α(c, bn2)}.
B. Shared key generation
Alice, Bob and Cindy share their public keys
commonly. This can be achieved by publishing their
public keys in a certified public key directory, e.g.
a trusted public electronic board. They then follow
the following steps to establish a shared secret key
F = f1(a, α(b, a)) · f2(c, α(b, c)) · f2(a, α(c, a)) ∈ T
.
1) Step 2.1: With Alice and Bob’s public keys,













Ω1 = f2(c, α(b, c))
and
Ω2 = f1(c, α(a, c)).
Finally, Cindy sends Ω1 ·Ω2 ∈ T to Alice and
Bob.
2) Step 2.2: With Bob and Cindy’s public keys,













Ω3 = f1(a, α(b, a))
and
Ω4 = f2(a, α(c, a)).
Finally, Alice sends Ω3 · Ω4 ∈ T to Cindy
and Bob.
3) Step 2.3: With Alice and Cindy’s public keys,













Ω5 = f2(b, α(a, b))
and
Ω6 = f1(b, α(c, b)).
Finally, Bob sends Ω5 · Ω6 ∈ T to Alice and
Cindy.
The shared secret key of Alice, Bob and Cindy is
F = f1(a, α(b, a))·f2(c, α(b, c))·f2(a, α(c, a)) ∈ T.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first explain why Alice, Bob and Cindy can
have the shared secret key F = f1(a, α(b, a)) ·
f2(c, α(b, c)) · f2(a, α(c, a)) ∈ T. Then we show an
adversary cannot work out the shared secret key.
A. Correctness of the shared secret key
In fact,
• Alice has Ω3 and Ω1 ·Ω2 and can compute F1 =
Ω3 · (Ω1 · Ω2).
• Bob has Ω5 and Ω1 ·Ω2 and can compute F2 =
Ω5 · (Ω1 · Ω2).
• Cindy has Ω2 and Ω5 · Ω6 and can compute
F3 = (Ω5 · Ω6) · Ω2.
To explain Alice, Bob and Cindy share the key
F = f1(a, α(b, a)) · f2(c, α(b, c)) · f2(a, α(c, a)), it
is sufficient to show F1 = F2 = F3 = F . In fact, by
Axiom 2, we have
F1 = Ω3 · (Ω1 · Ω2) (7a)
= f1(a, α(b, a)) · (f2(c, α(b, c)) · f1(c, α(a, c)))
(7b)
= f1(a, α(b, a)) · f2(c, α(b, c)) · f2(a, α(c, a))
(7c)
= F. (7d)
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F2 = Ω5 · (Ω1 · Ω2) (8a)
= f2(b, α(a, b)) · (f2(c, α(b, c)) · f1(c, α(a, c)))
(8b)
= f1(a, α(b, a)) · f2(c, α(b, c)) · ff (a, α(c, a))
(8c)
= F. (8d)
F3 = (Ω5 · Ω6) · Ω2 (9a)
= (f2(b, α(a, b)) · f1(b, α(c, b))) · f1(c, α(a, c))
(9b)
= f1(a, α(b, a)) · f2(c, α(b, c)) · f2(a, α(c, a))
(9c)
= F. (9d)
B. Security of α(b, a) and α(c, a)
Without Alice’s private key, an adversary cannot
compute α(b, a) and α(c, a) in polynomial time.







e1(i). Similarly, the security
of α(a, b), α(c, b), α(a, c), and α(b, c) can be de-
rived.
C. Security of f1(a, α(b, a)) and f2(a, α(c, a))
To identify the input a and α(b, a) to the function
f1 are both computably infeasible for an adversary
in polynomial time. a is a secret key of Alice while
the adversary cannot compute α(b, a) in polynomial
time. Therefore, the adversary cannot work out
f1(a, α(b, a)). Similarly, an adversary cannot work
out f2(a, α(c, a)) and f2(c, α(b, c)) in polynomial
time.
D. Security against existing attacks on algebraic
based cryptographic primitives
Anshel et al. proposed a commutator key agree-
ment protocol based on braid groups and their
colored Burau representation [1]. Lee et al. proposed
a summit set attack on Anshel et al.’s protocol [5]. In
fact, the protocols in [1] which were broken by Lee
et al. were only some instances of the key agreement
based on braid groups. That attack could not be
applied to the generic construction of Anshel et
al.’s protocol [1]. Therefore, that attack could not be
applied to our three-party key establishment either.
This is because (1) our key agreement is a generic
construction; (2) our key agreement is based on
non-commutative monoids; (3) the key agreement is
one-time per key establishment. In [4], Vasco et al.
proposed two attacks on a public key cryptosystem
based on free partially commutative monoids and
groups. However, their attacks cannot be applied
to our three-party key agreement protocol. This
is because: On the one hand, their attacks are
ciphertext only attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks
while our protocol is key agreement. On the other
hand, the monoids in our paper are assumed to be
non-commutative.
Therefore, the adversary cannot compute the
shared secret key
F = f1(a, α(b, a)) · f2(c, α(b, c)) · f2(a, α(c, a))
in polynomial time.
Remark: In this paper, we only consider the
security of the protocol in polynomial time. This
is reasonable because the secret keys of participants
for one key agreement are used only once.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have proposed a three-party key
agreement protocol. The protocol is novel because
it is the first three-party key establishment based
on non-commutative monoids. The purpose of the
paper is to present a generic construction for de-
signing three-party key agreement based on non-
commutative monoids. Therefore, our next research
is to give a concrete three-party key agreement
protocol and show how exactly the parameters are
to be chosen.
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